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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the implications of the prevalence of suicide attacks or 
'martyrdom operations' in contemporary Islam. Historical and legal prece- 
dents from Islam and Christianity are adduced for the analysis and placed 
within the context of radical Islam. 
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1. Introduction to Radical Islam 
During the year since September 11, 2001 the appeal of radical Islam 
throughout parts of the Muslim world has become clear. This version of 
Sunni Islam, which emphasizes the role of jihad as a salvific and purify- 
ing act with the ultimate goal of establishing a messianic (in the sense of 
idealized) caliphal state encompassing all Muslims, has proved to be sig- 
nificant throughout Arabic and Urdu speaking Muslim countries. Rad- 
ical Islam is an exclusive ideology, which rejects substantial elements 
of Muslim civilization and history as non-Islamic, and does not hesitate 
to do the same for large numbers of present-day Muslims, mainly Sufis 
and Shi'ites, promiscuously using the term "apostate" to describe all who 
do not subscribe to its belief-system. It has a paranoid and apocalyptic 
outlook, usually subscribing to grand anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in- 
volving Jewish control of the world, and seeks to confront and eliminate 
those elements in contemporary Muslim society that it has identified 
as foreign. Side-by-side with this paranoid vision, it strongly embraces 
modern science and technology, and seeks to graft them onto its vision 
of the future of the Muslim world, after these tools have been stripped 
of their Western origins. While radical Islam does not appear (currently) 
to have the same mass appeal among Turks and Central Asians, nor 
for the most part among Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims, and only 
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a minimal appeal among African Muslims, since the Arabic and Urdu 
speaking countries are the intellectual heartland of Islam it is unclear 
whether this situation will persist. 
One of the contemporary defining components of radical Islam is the 
widespread use of or support for the use of suicide attacks (or "martyr- 
dom operations") as a weapon in the jihad against its perceived foes. It 
is, therefore, instructive to examine this tactic, including some of its ori- 
gins and possible implications for contemporary Islam (both traditional 
and radical). After the suicide attacks of September 11, 2001 it was to 
be expected that martyrdom operations would come under harsh review 
by moderate Muslim countries, with official ulama' (religious leaders) 
issuing fatwas (legal opinions) demonstrating the religious illegitimacy 
of this method of fighting. Indeed, initially to some extent this did hap- 
pen, as both Abd al-Aziz b. Abdallah Al al-Shaykh, the Grand Mufti of 
Saudi Arabia, and Shaykh Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantawi, the Shaykh 
of al-Azhar University in Cairo, issued fatwas stating that martyrdom 
operations against civilians (most specifically with regard to the United 
States) were not in accordance with acceptedjihad methodology. In addi- 
tion to these two prominent figures, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a promi- 
nent leader of the Muslim Brethren, modified his previously declared 
support for martyrdom operations and stated that they were only to be 
used against Israeli soldiers.2 No other prominent shaykhs followed their 
examples, and all three of these distinguished clerics have now retracted 
their opposition to "martyrdom operations," at least with regard to Is- 
rael.3 
Because of the extensive glorification of martyrdom operations and 
public adulation for the "martyrs" produced as a result, it is legitimate 
to ask whether we are witnessing a change in Sunni Islam as a whole. 
Martyrdom operations are not only a military tactic, but one which has 
social ramifications as well in what is revealed about the current state 
of Sunni Islam, especially given the fact that suicide is prohibited by 
the Qur'an (2:195, 4:29) and that traditionally Muslim countries have 
had the lowest suicide rates in the world (Rosenthal 1946; Kohlberg 
1998). Since "martyrdom operations" are designed to carry a message 
2 Al-Qa'ida in its "Proclamation" 3 points out the irrationality of those shaykhs who say 
that "martyrdom operations" are legal only as long as they are used against Israel. d For al-Qaradawi, see qaradawi.net (April 7, 2002), and the interview with al-Jazira 
(December 2001) "The Palestinian Intifada and Martyrdom Operations" at qudsway.com/ 
akhbar/arshiv/12-2001.htm; for al-Tantawi, see memri.org, Special Dispatch no. 363: 
"Leading Egyptian Government Cleric Calls for "Martyrdom Attacks That Strike Horror 
into the Hearts of the Enemies of Allah" (April 4, 2002); for Al Shaykh see maktaba. 
net/articles "Confusion over fatawa on Martyrdom Operations by the Grand Mufti of 
Saudi Arabia" (December 15, 2001); and see the commentary on this latter issue by Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi at tawhed.ws (section on fatawa), dated August 2002. 
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to both Muslims and non-Muslims, it is legitimate to ask what precisely 
the intended and the actual message conveyed is. When the attraction 
to a given method, such as martyrdom operations, is so very strong and 
pervasive throughout the core Muslim lands, while the obvious revulsion 
and rejection on the part of the outside world, including many Muslims, 
is equally passionate one must ask what precisely is the reason for this 
polarity and what are its implications. 
2. Martyrdom Operations 
Justifying martyrdom operations is not as easily accomplished as one 
might be led to think by the prevalence of fatwas supporting them. Since 
there is now a substantial body of legal literature available signed by 
the pens of the shaykhs supporting martyrdom operations, it is possi- 
ble to see the methods by which their conclusions have been obtained. 
The fatwas examined include those of Shaykhs al-Tantawi, al-Qaradawi, 
and the Saudi radical shaykhs Hamud b. 'Uqla al-Shu'aybi, Sulayman 
al-'Alwan, 'Ali b. Khudayr al-Khudayr, together with the anonymous le- 
gal opinion "The Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations" written for 
the Chechen rebels, which was probably penned by the Saudi radical 
circle of al-Shu'aybi,4 and a number of collections of fatwas on this sub- 
ject (with a total of 46 different ones). There are two basic groups of 
fatwas available: those from the areas of Egypt and Palestine, which usu- 
ally seek to confine martyrdom operations to Israel (numbering 30 from 
among the 46), and those from Saudi Arabia, Chechnya and the support- 
ers of al-Qa'ida which are more globalistic in nature (numbering 9 from 
among the 46 total; the remaining 7 do not specify any locality). Taken 
together, this literature gives us a window into the world-view of both 
the stated and some of the unstated reasons for the sudden appearance 
and prominence of martyrdom operations in the contemporary Muslim 
world. 
Most of these pieces start out with a political commentary, leading 
us to note the primary reason for martyrdom operations: the perceived 
situation of the Muslim world. This situation is usually painted in very 
stark and humiliating terms for Muslims world wide, who are presented 
as those lacking all choice or volition in the contemporary world. Islam 
is either seen as entirely gone from the world or on the verge of being 
extinguished. A typical exposition of this attitude was given by Sulayman 
Abu Ghayth, the spokesman for al-Qa'ida, who stated in his justification 
of the attack of Sept. 11, 2001: 
4 For further examples of fatwas permitting or enjoining martyrdom operations, see 
Permissibility; Masa'il jihadiyya, 25-42 (listing 32 opinions from different scholars); also 
Feldner 2001; and Cook 2002. 
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Those who were surprised, astonished and did not expect [the 
September 11 attack], those simply do not know the reality of human- 
ity and human nature, or the effect of tyranny and oppression upon its 
feelings. . . they apparently thought that tyranny breeds submission and 
that force yields resignation. . . those have missed the mark twice: once, 
because they are ignorant of the reality of derision towards a person, and 
another time because they do not know the ability of a person to achieve 
victory. This is [with regard to] any person, let alone to one who believes 
in God as Lord, in Islam as a religion and in Muhammad as Prophet and 
Messenger. [He] knows that his religion refuses lowliness and does not per- 
mit humiliation for him, and rejects degradation. How could it, when he 
knows that his community [Islam] was brought forth to be at the center of 
leadership and trail blazing, at the center of hegemony and domination, at 
the center of giving and receiving? (Abu Ghayth 2002) 
The authors of the fatwas then usually cite four verses, which for them 
point the direction in which the martyr should go. The first one is: "And 
some people sell themselves for the sake of Allah's favor. Allah is kind 
to His servants." (Qur'an 2:207; all Qur'anic translations from Fakhry) 
In the context of the holy book the kind of person described in this verse 
is set in contrast to another type of personality, the hypocritical and 
arrogant man, who although outwardly a servant of God, inwardly is 
rebellious. But when taken alone, especially in the context of the other 
verses cited in support of martyrdom operations, the verse seems to be 
saying that giving up everything for God's favor, including one's life, is 
the highest goal (Ibn Abi Shayba 4:223 [no. 19432]). 
Foundational for the doctrine of jihad is the second verse usually cited 
in the fatwas, which is the salvific compact: 
Allah has bought from the believers their lives and their wealth in return 
for Paradise; they fight in the way of Allah, kill and are killed. That is a 
true promise from Him in the Torah, the Gospel and the Qur'an and who 
fulfills His promise better than Allah? Rejoice then at the bargain you have 
made with Him; for that is the great triumph. (9:110) 
It is noteworthy that once again, as in the previous selection, this verse 
speaks of buying and selling; the believer is enjoined to give up his life in 
return for the promise of Paradise. Furthermore, according to the third 
verse usually cited by the fatwas, one must not be too attached to this 
life: 
Indeed you will find them [the evil-doers] of all people the most attached 
to life, even more than those who associated other gods with Allah. Every 
one of them wishes to live for one thousand years. This long life, however, 
will not spare them the punishment. (Qur'an 2:96) 
This attachment to life is specifically said to be common to the Jews 
who are the subject of this verse, and therefore those who are fighting 
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them (and what the radicals claim to be the Jewish domination of the 
world) should be most concerned to deny them the same. Dr. 'Abdallah 
al-Naggar, the religion columnist for the Egyptian newspaper al- 
Gumhuriyya, phrased this quite forcefully: 
What is distressing is that their protection of their life has become an 
incentive for them to bolster their status by the means of science and inven- 
tions. They have explored all means of defending their lives and imposing 
their inferior ideas on humanity through force of arms, while the men of 
truth [Muslims] have been negligent; they have not excelled at science and 
have not explored means that will guarantee their triumph in their strug- 
gle against men of falsehood [non-Muslims]. . .Yet their enemies protect 
[their] lives like a miser protects his money. They do not give [their lives] 
easily; they do not enter into battles seeking martyrdom. . . this is the se- 
cret of the believers' victory over their enemies - though the believers are 
few and the polytheists many with advanced weaponry and equipment. 
(Trans, memri.org Special Dispatch no. 289 [October 19, 2001] from al- 
Gumhuriyya, October 7, 2001) 
Finally, the verse from the Qur'anic version of the David and Goliath 
story is cited: "How many a small band has defeated a larger one by 
Allah's leave. Allah is with the steadfast" (Qur'an 2:249). Taken together 
these verses, although none of them specifically enjoins suicide attacks, 
present a self-sacrificing picture on the part of the fighting believer, who 
is part of a smaller group, as opposed to the larger number of unbelievers, 
who are attached to this life and do not want to die. 
The scholars justifying martyrdom operations then move to the 
Prophet Muhammad's tradition (the hadith), which contains a number 
of stories showing early Muslims who were willing to attack obviously 
superior numbers (in accordance with Qur'an 2:249) and died in the pro- 
cess. From these stories, the scholars deduce that there is nothing wrong 
with carrying out a suicidal mission in battle, because one who carries 
out a martyrdom operation is similar to the one who attacks a superior 
force without hope of surviving. They then contrast the hopeful nature 
of one who carries out a martyrdom operation with the depression of one 
who commits suicide, intending to show that the two actions are not the 
same. 
The name 'suicide operations' used by some is inaccurate, and in fact this 
name was chosen by the Jews to discourage people from such endeavors. 
How great is the difference between one who commits suicide - because of 
his unhappiness, lack of patience and weakness, or absence of iman [faith] 
and has been threatened with Hell-Fire - and between the self-sacrificer 
who embarks on the operation out of strength of faith, and to bring victory 
to Islam, by sacrificing his life for the upliftment of Allah's Word! (Permis- 
ibility 2) 
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The Saudi radical al-Shu'aybi, in his justification of martyrdom opera- 
tions, concludes that 
the martyrdom operations are legitimate actions, part of waging jihad 
in the path of God - if the intent of the perpetrator is pure - because they 
are among the most successful of the means of jihad and effectiveness 
against the enemies of this faith [Islam]. This is because of the terror and 
the casualties - whether in killed or wounded - they cause, and the spread 
of fear, anxiety and impermanence because of them, and because of the 
reward they give to the Muslims, the strengthening of their hearts and 
the breaking of the hearts of their enemies . . . and other benefits of jihad. 
(al-Shu'aybi 1) 
The stated purpose therefore, as in "The Islamic Ruling on the Per- 
missibility of Martyrdom Operations," is both to spread terror, and to 
"strengthen the hearts of the Muslims." Although these goals are both 
perhaps part of a war-making effort, neither purpose is necessarily very 
effective in achieving victory. 
Upon reading the legal literature enjoining the use of martyrdom op- 
erations one realizes it is clear that the arguments are extremely weak. 
This is revealed by the characterization of martyrdom operations as "the 
pinnacle of the summit of jihad" (durwat sinam al-jihad) given by the 
authors of the fatwas such as al-Qaradawi and Abu Sa'id al-Amili (2002). 
Anyone reading that for the first time is struck first of all by the use of 
this evocative phrase, which is common in the traditional description of 
jihad itself: "The most important of all things is conversion to Islam, 
but its pillars are prayer, and the pinnacle of its summit is jihad. . " 
(al-Tirmidhi 4:124-5 [no. 2749]; see Wensinck, s.v. sanam for variants) 
Those of a historical bent must be surprised by the appearance of mar- 
tyrdom operations as the "pinnacle of the summit of jihad"; after all, 
Muslims have been waging jihad in both its military and spiritual forms 
for 14 centuries. Are we to assume that all of these Muslims were denied 
the opportunity to achieve the pinnacle because they were ignorant of it? 
It seems clear that by referring to martyrdom operations as "the pinnacle 
of the summit of jihad" the authors of these fatwas are actually trying to 
conceal the novel nature of the operation as well as its problematic sta- 
tus in Muslim law. The fact that martyrdom operations are very new to 
Islam leaves the legal opinions cited above open to the deadly accusation 
of being an "innovation."5 Muslim critics of the use of "martyrdom op- 
erations," including Al al-Shaykh cited above and the prominent Saudi 
moderate Ibn 'Uthaymin have focused upon this problem, noting that 
this tactic has a very weak historical basis in Islamic law and practice. 
5 Al-Shu'aybi 1 puts this very delicately: "these operations are contemporary develop- 
ments unknown in the past in their present-day form." 
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Although these criticisms are important, there are substantial incon- 
sistencies within the fatwas and the evidence they supply for their jus- 
tifications. These center around three basic problems: 
1. One must ask whether there is a difference between attacking a 
superior force and suicide attacks. Much of the legal material adduced 
above seeks to draw an analogy between an extremely hopeless situa- 
tion in battle - such as that of a single fighter charging a much larger 
enemy group, which is a situation frequently discussed by the classical 
authorities (summarized by Ibn al-Nahhas al-Dumyati 1:557-60) - and 
that of suicide attacks. One who charges a much larger number of ene- 
mies may or may not die (he could overwhelm the enemy by his personal 
bravery or be taken prisoner by them), and in any case his death is not 
the sole purpose of his attack. On the contrary, he can only continue to 
fight the enemy while he is alive. In a suicide attack the death of the per- 
petrator is the primary driving purpose of the operation with the hope 
that he take as many of the enemy with him as is possible and that 
his intention be to lift the Word of God to the highest (Qur'an 9:41). 6 
Therefore, he will avoid any hostilities or even attracting attention to 
himself previous to his own death lest his ultimate purpose be undone or 
uncompleted. 
2. Perceived necessity is clearly driving the fatwas and leads to the 
question of whether radical Muslims are making any attempt to pro- 
vide a superior moral example. Is the legal basis to be that whatever 
is necessary to win is justified? Upon examining the fatwas enjoining 
"martyrdom operations" one notices that no attempt is made to confront 
the question of what they actually do either on behalf of Muslims (in ei- 
ther the tactical or the strategic sense) or to Islam as a whole. While we 
will cover this latter issue below, several Muslim critics have pointed out 
this problem (Ibn 'Uthaymin especially), and questioned the efficacy of 
martyrdom operations with regard to their inability to achieve any mili- 
tary results. This has been historically true as well. Japanese kamikazes 
failed to stop the advance of the United States armed forces during World 
War II despite the fear they engendered. There is no example of any seri- 
ously entrenched army defending territory to which the soldiers' mother 
country is committed or sees as a necessary asset being deterred, let 
alone defeated, by suicide attacks. (However, suicide attacks can deter 
an uncommitted state or army that might see the cost of a given series 
of operations as a price they are unwilling to pay.) 
With regard to Israel, India, Turkey, Russia and the United States, 
which have been the principal targets of martyrdom operations during 
the past twenty years, only the United States in Lebanon during 1983-84 
6 Noted by Ibn 'Uthaymin, who is cited al-'Amili 3 (I could not find the original citation). 
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was actually persuaded to abandon a mission because of suicide attacks 
(and this was almost certainly because of the ill-defined nature of the 
operation and lack of political will to sustain it). For the most part, all 
of the above target countries have been either unmoved by martyrdom 
operations or have actually been strengthened in their national resolve 
as a result of being attacked in this manner. The best example is that 
of Hizbullah, which together with other Shi'ite groups used suicide as a 
means to expel the United States from Beirut as previously stated, but 
when fighting the Israelis in southern Lebanon ended up abandoning 
this tactic and returning to the unconventional warfare which eventually 
resulted in Israel's withdrawal in 2000. 
3. For the most part, the legal opinions avoid the question of discrimi- 
nation on the part of the "martyr" with regard to the difference between 
soldiers and civilians. This is the difference between the more respectable 
opinions stemming from al-Tantawi and other Egyptian religious lead- 
ers (who have tried to confine "martyrdom operations" to Israeli soldiers 
in the West Bank and Gaza) (in accord with the classical sources, see 
Abou El Fadl 1999, 150-3), and al-Qaradawi (who sees all Israelis as 
soldiers and thus avoids the issue) as opposed to the more radical Saudi 
shaykhs, who usually state that because westerners pay taxes to their 
governments, civilian populations are all responsible for the actions of 
the latter, and are therefore legitimate targets. While al-Tantawi and 
others are concerned with making certain that "martyrdom operations" 
are confined to obvious military targets, the Saudi shaykhs have decided 
that all targets in enemy territories (including apparent enemies such 
as Israel, India and Russia, and non-belligerent enemies such as those 
in Europe and the United States) are legitimate. For this purpose the 
Saudi shaykhs provide us with the example of the mangonel, which in 
the classical texts lobbed large payloads (usually of rock or during later 
times explosives) at a city or fortress walls or occasionally over them in 
an indiscriminate fashion. Permission to use this weapon by medieval 
scholars is supposed to provide us with an analogy to what today would 
be referred to as "collateral damage." Again, this analogy is unconvinc- 
ing. The reasons for the use of the mangonel were military in nature; the 
appearance of "collateral damage" was peripheral to the overall military 
purpose. In the fatwas allowing martyrdom operations the "collateral 
damage" is actually the goal of the operation rather than a side effect. 
"Collateral damage" may be a disturbing and even horrifying fact of war- 
fare, but it is still very different from cold-blooded slaughter or targeting 
a civilian population with the excuse that they should have known better 
than to be in the way. 
More convincing is the use of another analogy taken from the medieval 
scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) who dealt with the question of what a 
Muslim army was supposed to do when an opposing infidel enemy used 
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Muslims as human shields.7 This was far from a hypothetical scenario, 
as the Mongols (against whom Ibn Taymiyya was writing) used precisely 
this tactic frequently. Ibn Taymiyya, once again, tells us regretfully that 
if there is no other choice then the Muslim army must attack the enemy 
and not be deterred by human shields. In short, there is a duality to the 
action; if the point of the action as a whole is to kill the enemy, and the 
only way to do that is by also killing the Muslim "shield" then the action 
is approved. It is the responsibility of the Muslims to gain the victory and 
not to worry about killing their innocent co-religionists. In the contempo- 
rary literature on martyrdom operations, the analogy goes more or less 
that since civilians surround what radical Muslims consider to be legiti- 
mate targets one cannot always take their lives into consideration if the 
victory is to be obtained. Since Ibn Taymiyya gave permission to sacrifice 
even Muslim civilians in the case of "human shields," therefore, the lives 
of civilian infidels cannot be more valuable (Proclamation 4). It goes with- 
out saying that this argument directly contradicts a number of prophetic 
traditions in which fighters are enjoined to spare non-combatants (al- 
Bukhari 4:26 [nos. 3014-5]; Abu Da'ud 3:53-4 [nos. 2668-72]; Malik b. 
Anas 278 [no. 980]). 
3. A Historical Comparison with Christianity and Buddhism 
While considering the issue of "martyrdom operations," one is struck 
by the lack of a parallel with other faiths that actively promote martyr- 
dom or provide widespread cultural or religious approval of the idea of 
dying for one's faith. Christianity and Buddhism provide the most obvi- 
ous examples of faiths in which martyrdom plays a key role, and in which 
martyrs are widely held to have superior spiritual status. In Christianity 
the predominant idea of martyrdom is a passive one in which the fore- 
most paradigm is that of the saint who is presented with a choice between 
compromising his faith and suffering or death, and is enjoined to chose 
the latter. Is there a sense of martyrdom attached to those who force the 
issue by manipulating a situation so as to lead to their own deaths? It 
is my feeling that for the most part in Christian history there is not, 
although I would like to return to a historical example in which this was 
the case and see whether some useful comparisons can be made with con- 
temporary Islam. Christian martyrs may sustain the faith by example, 
but are not allowed to drive the circumstances leading to their deaths or 
cause their own deaths lest they be punished eternally as suicides. 
In Buddhism we find a more active role on the part of the martyr. 
From the Lotus Sutra we find this sense of self-sacrifice: 
7 However, even the radical al-Sawi 12 notes that both the "mangonel" and the "human 
shield" arguments are weak because they were only allowed in cases of open battle. 
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O Beflowered by the King of Constellations! If there is one who, opening 
up his thought ... if he can burn a finger or even a toe as an offering to 
a Buddhastupa, he shall exceed one who uses realm or walled city, wife 
or children, or even all the lands, mountains, forests, rivers, ponds and 
sundry precious objects in the whole thousand-millionfold world as offer- 
ings (Hurvitz 298, thanks to David Gray for this reference; compare Matt. 
5:27-30). 
As Paul Williams, in his study of Mahayana Buddhism, has stated, this 
citation is the foundation of the practice of body-burning among East 
Asian Buddhists. However, these practices appear comparatively rarely 
attested in the historical sources (Williams 1989, 153-5). One should 
also note the similarity between this statement and the Qur'anic verse 
2:207 "and some people sell themselves for the sake of Allah's favor" used 
today to justify suicide attacks. 
There are several examples from medieval Christianity that need to 
be compared with the contemporary status of Islam as perceived by Mus- 
lim radicals. Spanish Christianity during the ninth century is known for 
a movement called "the voluntary martyrs of Cordoba" (see Waltz 1970). 
Between the years 850-9, after Islam had been dominant on the Iberian 
Peninsula for about 140 years, a number of monks and Christian lead- 
ers voluntarily committed actions they knew would lead to martyrdom, 
primarily cursing the Prophet Muhammad or impugning his prophet- 
hood, in the capital city of Cordoba. Although the numbers were not very 
great - around a total of 50 over the nine-year period - their spiritual 
example was a powerful one for Latin Christianity, which was just then 
beginning to come into its own. 
Spanish Christian society during the ninth century was in the pro- 
cess of being assimilated by the Arabic speaking Islamic civilization. 
Although at this time the number of converts to Islam from Christianity 
was probably not very large, the foundation was laid for later mass con- 
version. The language of choice for most intellectuals and even church 
leaders was Arabic, and the level of admiration for Islamic culture was 
very high. One of the most famous statements describing Spanish Chris- 
tianity from this time was made by Paul Albar, who asserted: 
Do not all the Christian youths . . . distinguished for their knowledge of 
Gentile [Muslim] lore, highly regarded for their ability to speak Arabic, do 
they not all eagerly use the volumes of the Chaldeans [Muslims], read them 
with the greatest interest, discuss them ardently, and, collecting them with 
great trouble, make them known with every praise of their tongue, while 
they are ignorant of the beauty of the Church and look with disgust upon 
the Church's rivers of paradise as something vile. Alas! Christians do not 
know their own law, and Latins do not use their own tongue, so that in the 
all the college of Christ there will hardly be found one man in a thousand 
who can send correct letters of greeting to a brother. And a manifold crowd 
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without number will be found who give out learnedly long sentences of 
Chaldean [Arabic] rhetoric (Waltz 1970, 153-4). 
Several churchmen and intellectuals, led by Albar and Eulogius (both 
of whom sacrificed themselves during the voluntary martyrdom move- 
ment), sought to change this situation by publicly denying the prophet- 
hood of Muhammad. This was a capital offense in the eyes of Muslims, 
but not in the eyes of Christians, most of whom thought privately what 
the martyrs said publicly. All of those who sought martyrdom achieved 
it, and although none of them killed anyone other than themselves - 
unlike contemporary Muslim radicals - I believe the two groups can be 
compared justly in their effect upon their respective civilizations and 
historical situations. One scholar writes: 
Briefly, then, the significance of the voluntary martyrs of ninth-century 
Cordoba was the crystallization and exemplification of an ideology that po- 
larized relations between Christianity and Islam, between Latin- Christian 
and Arabic-Islamic culture into explicit and lasting ideological conflict 
(Waltz 1970, 229). 
This is precisely what is happening at the present time, although of 
course in reverse. Today it is the civilization of the West (not specifically 
Christian, but Christian in origin and influence) that is the attractant. 
If one exchanged the words mentioning "Arabic" and "Chaldean" in Al- 
bar's statement above for "Western" and "English" the same would hold 
true for many places in the Muslim world. Old barriers have broken 
down to such an extent, according to the perception of the Muslim radi- 
cals, that it is necessary to find a polarizing issue through which those 
boundaries can be recreated. For the ninth-century Christians this issue 
was the prophethood of Muhammad. There were many other elements 
of Arabic-Islamic civilization that were congenial to Christians, just as 
many elements of the Qur'an could speak to Christians (the reverence 
towards Jesus, etc.). In order to stem the tide of conversion, and the even 
more insidious cultural dilution of their Christian heritage in favor of the 
Islamic one, the voluntary martyrs had to highlight the one point about 
Islam that would cause a negative reaction on the part of Christians. 
They did this in such a manner as to show that it mattered, that it was 
worth dying for. 
It seems clear that these martyrdoms were intended to be both indi- 
vidual expiation as well as a testimonial to those Spanish Christians who 
might have been considering converting to Islam. It is striking, however, 
that in the Spanish case of voluntary martyrdom the results were not 
what the martyrs had hoped for. They were unable to stanch the flow 
of conversions to Islam. No doubt the Spanish Christians Albar and Eu- 
logius would have understood contemporary Muslim radicals very well. 
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Both 8th century Spanish Christians and contemporary Muslim radi- 
cals suffered (according to their own perception) marginalization and to 
a large degree even the contempt of their social betters, who want to live 
and let live, to take life less seriously, and to emphasize the commonal- 
ities between the faiths rather than the differences. For many contem- 
porary Muslims, the radicals are an embarrassment, a group that drags 
them back to a primitive and stark view of the world (and especially of 
non-Muslims) with which they are not comfortable. It is of crucial impor- 
tance, therefore, for the radical Muslims to sacrifice their more moderate 
brethren, which they regularly do through the process of declaring them 
to be non-Muslims (takfir), and to discredit their spirituality (by placing 
an inordinate emphasis upon fighting the jihad as a salvific action) in 
order to redraw the boundaries. Perhaps ideally both the voluntary mar- 
tyrs of Cordoba and the present-day Muslim radicals would like to save 
as many of their nominal brethren within the boundaries of the faith as 
they could, but they view the boundaries as more important than being 
possessed of large numbers of less than completely sincere believers. One 
should note that radical Muslims have not hesitated to use "martyrdom 
operations" against fellow Muslims, such as Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, who 
expired on September 13, 2001. Despite his heroic participation in the 
jihad against the communists during the 1980s, two Arab radical Mus- 
lims were willing to commit suicide just to insure his death. Since the 
radicals have chosen jihad as the criterion for judging a given Muslim's 
Islam, and placed a heavy emphasis upon "martyrdom operations," they 
appear to be willing to place many Muslims outside the fold in order to 
achieve their goals. 
Returning to the contemporary Muslim material, we find that one 
of the major fatwas enjoining the use of "martyrdom operations," that 
written by the Saudi radical shaykh Ibn Jibrin, speaks of them in this 
manner: 
There is no doubt that the suicide [sic!] missions in the path of God 
against the enemies of God, His Messenger [Muhammad] and the enemies 
of the Muslims are a noble sacrifice (qurban) offered by the Muslim to 
his Lord . . . (Ibn Jibrin, Fatwas 4; compare Masail jihadiyya 26, of Taj 
al-Din Hilali, ruin afdal al-qarabat al-lati yastwahabuhu sahibuhu ridwan 
Allah) 
The Qur'anic word qurban (linguistically derived from the Hebrew qor- 
ban, cf. Lev. 7:38, Matt. 15:5) appears to imply that there is a sense of 
atonement for a sin stemming probably from a sense of perceived failure 
and humiliation because of the circumstances of Islam in the present 
world. The radical Muslims judge themselves against the standard of 
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Qur'an 3:110, which states that the Muslims are the best community 
that the world has ever seen. Failure to live up to that standard consti- 
tutes a sin. Furthermore, we are told by another radical shaykh, Abu 
Sa'd al-'Amili: 
Creation of terror among the enemy is not the only goal - and certainly 
not a goal in and of itself-but the goal is to proclaim the truth, and that is 
a goal that is sufficient o move forward with these martyrdom operations. 
But the goal of the fighter is, as we have said, the attainment of God's 
favor, and success in entering heaven. His action in this regard constitutes 
in truth the highest pinnacle of martyrdom, just as jihad is the highest 
pinnacle of Islam (al-'Amili 3). 
Therefore, the usefulness of martyrdom operations as a method of pro- 
claiming and demonstrating one's affirmation of the truth, and its worth 
to the believer, is something that both the voluntary martyrs of Cordoba 
and the contemporary Muslim radical martyrs share in common. They 
view their sacrifices as necessary as a result of the perceived low sta- 
tus of the belief system they hold dear, and to shore up the boundaries 
between Islam and infidelity. 
4. Ramifications for Contemporary Islam 
After the historical comparison, we must come back to our question: 
since the glorification and acceptance of martyrdom operations is so 
great, what (if any) are the ramifications for contemporary Islam? Can 
we speak of this as a crucial moment in one of world's largest and most 
successful faiths? It is clear that in this regard there will have to be sev- 
eral different lines of analysis, because the feelings of many Muslims do 
not coincide with the observations of an outside spectator. The outsider 
looking at the Muslim world can be impressed by the world- wide reach of 
the faith, its remarkable, even unique (with the exceptions of Christian- 
ity and Marxism), ability to appeal to humanity as a whole. Islam seems 
more healthy politically than it was 100 years ago, when many Muslims 
lived under the rule of non-Muslims. As for the practical application of 
Islam, during the past fifty years more and more Muslims have come 
to live under the shari'a law (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, parts of Nige- 
ria and partially enforced in Libya and Pakistan). But in the economic 
and technological spheres one can truly say that the Muslim world has 
little to its credit, and it seems that Muslim intellectual life is vibrant 
primarily in peripheral or non-Muslim countries where there is freedom 
of expression. 
However, reading Muslim literature, especially radical Muslim liter- 
ature, one sees an entirely different perspective. Usually the negative 
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portrayals start with the political state of the Muslim world, and concen- 
trate on the failure to eradicate Israel or to solve other Muslim minority 
issues (such as those of Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Philippines) to their satisfaction. Frustration concerning the Palestinian 
issue is a major factor in the development of "martyrdom operations"; we 
have already noted the preponderance offatwas citing this grievance in 
the introduction. In their social critiques radical Muslims pay little at- 
tention to the number of states or territories voluntarily adopting the 
sharia, but they pour a great deal of criticism upon the shortcomings 
of the states which have done so. This critique is usually based upon a 
holistic understanding of the Divine Law; it is not enough that it be im- 
posed partially or over a period of time. It must be imposed immediately 
and in its totality (there is little thought given to the question of what to 
do if this proves not to be a solution to the Muslim world's problems). As 
a result of these types of critiques there is a great deal of self-flagellation 
over the lack of absolute Muslim unity and little focus upon that which 
exists. 
With these two different analyses in mind, what does the glorification 
of "martyrdom operations" achieve for the contemporary Muslim world? 
One must say that they do erase shame and humiliation, and restore 
perceived lost honor, at least in the eyes of those Muslim intellectuals 
and religious leaders who tend to speak out. With such a negative self- 
assessment as previously described, one could come to the conclusion 
that there is nothing of any worth in contemporary Islamic civilization. 
"Martyrdom operations" show that there is something worth dying for. 
However, unfortunately this is accomplished by a means that is again 
very self-flagellatory in nature. This can be easily seen by noting the 
comments and messages left by martyrs (oftentimes played for the me- 
dia in the wake of their operations). Usually these messages are very 
accusatory, referring to their self-sacrifices as being necessary to com- 
pensate for the lack of courage and heroism in the present-day Muslim 
world. Several representative examples can suffice. Ahmad al-Haznawi, 
one of the September 11, 2001 hijackers, left such an accusatory message 
(msnbc, April 16, 2002), as did his fellow Abd al-Aziz al-'Umari. In the 
Palestinian context, Ay at al-Akhras, a young woman who blew herself up 
on March 29, 2002 in an Israeli supermarket in Jerusalem, stated that 
"now even women are martyring themselves for the Palestinian cause. 
Where are the Arab leaders?" (cited by Eric Silver, The Independent, 
March 30, 2002) In other words, the last words or analyses of the mo- 
tivations of the martyrs oftentimes affirm a negative judgment; even if 
the actions themselves are sacrificial, they are self-sacrificial, not a com- 
munal sacrifice (although perhaps some would wish them to be). In some 
ways these martyrs are using their actions to tell the Muslim world what 
it wants to hear, and what it wants to hear is that everything is on the 
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verge of destruction.8 This message is also echoed by those who justify 
"martyrdom operations" after the fact. However, in their interpretation, 
what is self-sacrificial from the personal standpoint of the "martyr" be- 
comes service to the larger cause of Islam. For example concerning the 
September 11 attackers, the al-Qa'ida proclamation states 
The only motive for these youths was to defend the religion of God, their 
honor and their sanctity - not in service to humanity nor in service to any 
ideology whether eastern or western - but in service to Islam, and in de- 
fense of its people by their pure intentions, willingly not coerced. This 
[mission] was also given as a message to all the enemies of the [Muslim] 
community in that we will strike with an iron fist the heads of our enemies 
despite their strength and our weakness. It was also given especially at this 
time because it verifies to the community that is living in distress in every 
place in these days that the only way to salvation from this humiliation is 
the sword. The enemy does not understand any language other than this 
(Proclamation 1). 
The question, therefore, is one of power and lack thereof, together 
with the perceived humiliation of not being at the center of the world 
stage. 
There are a number of other, more negative ramifications to "mar- 
tyrdom operations" that must be brought out, among them the manner 
in which they are justified in Muslim law. It is clear from a reading of 
Muslim law that "martyrdom operations," especially of the usual variety 
directed against civilians, should never have even come up for discussion, 
let alone become so widely accepted (for example, Malik b. Anas 278-9 
[nos 980-3] details the reasons why one should not attack women and 
children even if they are participating in open warfare against Muslims). 
For this acceptance Muslim religious leaders bear a heavy responsibil- 
ity. Few have stood out against these types of operations, and those few, 
as previously demonstrated, have mostly recanted or fallen silent, to a 
large degree because of political opposition to either Israel or the United 
States. But in fact, it is entirely irrelevant what someone's opinion of 
Israel or the United States or any of the enemies of radical Islam - or 
even Muslims in general - is in this regard. Obviously Muslim law, like 
any religious law, should be trying to make the world conform to its 
higher standards, and not descend to the lowest level possible on the 
simple justification that the enemy is a cruel one or that necessity de- 
mands it. Therefore, the stance of the religious leaders should be one of 
8 Stated regularly by even mainstream Muslims, but much more among radicals: see, 
e.g., Safar al-Hawali, "Open Letter to President Bush," at azzam.com (October 10, 2001); 
and Hamud b. 'Uqla al-Shu'aybi, "Fatwa on Events Following 11 Sept. 2001," at azzam.com 
(November 30, 2001). 
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raising the discourse and standards, not of following after the whims of 
the blood-thirsty mob. It is also clear that by issuing fatwas in support 
of martyrdom operations against Israel, establishment or governmental 
figures such as al-Tantawi and al-Qaradawi have opened a Pandora's 
Box they cannot control. Once these legal justifications are in existence 
they cannot be retracted. One should note that radical Muslims poured 
scorn upon both al-Tantawi and al-Qaradawi after their "retractions" in 
the wake of September 11. It is far from clear that anyone actually paid 
attention to these retractions in any case (other than to make fun of 
the haste with which both denounced the "martyrdom operations" they 
had previously supported so fervently), and when both leaders retracted 
their retractions in the spring of 2002, it seems clear that they were 
only affirming what was popular in the Arab Muslim world (support for 
"martyrdom operations" against Israel). The whole episode called into 
question their sense of leadership. 
One is driven to ask in the wake of watching Muslims destroy their 
own standards with regard to war-making, how can an outsider have 
confidence in Muslim justice when even basic standards laid out in the 
Qur'an and the traditions are flouted, not only by the populace, but by 
the religious leadership that knows better, in supporting "martyrdom 
operations"? Does the embrace of "martyrdom operations" cheapen Is- 
lam itself as a whole when so few are willing to stand up and critique 
them? One looks in vain among those few such as Ibn 'Uthaymin who 
have consistently opposed "martyrdom operations" for some moral re- 
vulsion at the tactic; instead all the critique seems to center around the 
lack of Islamic legal precedent and questions concerning the tactical and 
strategic achievements of "martyrdom operations." Consider the radical 
"Proposed Draft Constitution for a Muslim State," penned by Taqi al- 
Din al-Nabhani and circulated widely in Europe among radical circles 
(article 180): 
Ends do not justify the means, because the method is integral to the 
thought. Thus, the [necessary action] (wajib) and the permitted [action] 
(mubah) cannot be attained by performing the forbidden action (haram). 
Political means must not contradict the political methods (Nabhani 2000). 
It would be a positive development to see one of the distinguished reli- 
gious leaders confront the issues raised by this statement. Since suicide 
attacks or "martyrdom operations" are designed to pave the way for a 
caliphal pan-Islamic state (at least according to the radical Muslims), 
one must ask whether they create the pre-conditions for this type of 
a state to exist. Presumably such a state would be founded upon the 
shari'a; how would that be possible when the methods by which it 
would be (putatively) achieved blatantly contradict the hadith literature 
and make the illegal lawful? These questions need to be considered by 
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radical Muslims before they invent law that makes a mockery of Islamic 
tradition. 
What place do "martyrdom operations" give Islam in the world? Dur- 
ing his so-called "final speech" (released by alneda.com), Usama b. Ladin 
enumerated some of the benefits that Muslims have seen from the 
September 11 attacks. In his words, 
these events have clarified a number of extremely important issues for 
Muslims, as it has become completely clear that the West in general, and 
America at its head, carry an unimaginable "crusader" hatred for Islam 
(Bin Ladin). 
Clearly suicide attacks do actually have the effect Bin Ladin has de- 
scribed. They create (or recreate) boundaries between Muslims and non- 
Muslims, just as the "voluntary martyrs of Cordoba" did for Spanish 
Christianity. Since Bin Ladin wanted to discover hatred for Islam in the 
United States, that is what he discovered (he ignores the possibility that 
the means he used to discern the hatred he sees - the terror attacks - 
might have also caused it). 
However, one must ask: what is the strategic point of it all? Violence for 
political or religious purposes has to be kept within certain bounds or its 
effect rebounds upon the perpetrator. If there is no cultural understand- 
ing as to the reason why the attack occurred in the first place then the 
action merely creates boundaries between those who accept the action as 
meritorious and those who see it as murder. This attitude can easily be 
seen with regard to September 11. The al-Qa'ida spokesman Sulayman 
Abu Ghayth stated in his article "Under the Shadow of the Lances" that 
America owed the Muslim world 4 million dead (among other things), 
and that the operation of September 11 was merely in response for the 
destruction of the al-'Amiriyya shelter (in Baghdad) during the Gulf War 
in 1991 during the course of which approximately 5000 civilians were 
killed (Abu Ghayth, part II, partial trans, memri.org, Special Dispatch 
no. 388, June 12, 2002, trans, above is mine). 
It is self-evident that the logic of this equivalence will be rejected by 
Americans, who will either not make this connection or reject it once it 
is pointed out to them. Simply put, the "martyrdom operation" is gen- 
erally a failure as a moral statement or as a political advertisement to 
large numbers of people (however, it is occasionally a success with re- 
gard to small groups of malcontents). Its perpetrators will simply be 
seen as murderers or crazed fanatics (which as we will see below is not 
necessarily the case), and the action will provoke revulsion and horror 
rather than the understanding and publicity terrorists seek to achieve. 
Several statements by prominent radical Muslims should be examined 
in this regard. Abu 'Ubayd al-Qurashi (who the pro-Iraqi London-based 
daily al-Quds al-'Arabi identified as a close associate of Usama b. Ladin) 
This content downloaded  on Mon, 4 Feb 2013 16:50:12 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
146 Journal of Religious Ethics 
wrote an article called "From Munich to New York." In this article he 
compared the relative significance of the 1972 attack upon the Israeli 
athletes at the Munich Olympics to that of the September 11, 2001 mar- 
tyrdom operation. He states: 
While the Munich operation failed to accomplish its goals, the New 
York raid was very well planned, and accomplished its planners' goals in 
full . . . Unlike the Munich operation which was limited and had limited 
national demands, the New York raid had broad goals and aspirations; it 
rang the bells of restoring Arab and Islamic glory as a whole . . . They did 
not aspire to gain Western sympathy; rather, they sought to expose the 
American lie and deceit to the peoples of the world - and foremost to the 
Islamic peoples (Abu 'Ubayd al-Qurashi, at memri.org, Special Dispatch 
no. 353, March 12, 2002). 
Therefore, there is a propaganda element to the martyrdom operation, 
but it is not directed at the United States or any Western audience at 
all. In the "Videotape of Usama b. Ladin" the latter states concerning 
this problem and reveals his understanding of the significance of the 
September 11, 2001 martyrdom operation: 
Those youth who conducted the operations did not accept any fiqh [law] in 
the popular terms, but they accepted the fiqh that the Prophet Muhammad 
brought. Those young men . . . said in deeds, in New York and Washington, 
speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere in the 
world. The speeches are understood by both Arabs and non-Arabs, even 
the Chinese . . . this event made people think, which benefited Islam greatly 
(Videotape transcript, CNN version, released December 13, 2001). 
Here we see one of the cruxes of the proclamation of jihad to the world. 
Radical Muslims see the method of suicide attacks as one of the best ad- 
vertisements they can use. As noted, it points the finger directly at Islam, 
and states (at least in their view) that this is a faith worth dying for (of 
course, it can have the opposite effect as well). Bin Ladin and the shaykh 
with whom he was conversing elaborate on the number of converts in 
the wake of September 11 and feel that a wave of conversions occurred 
as a result of the martyrdom operation. This is by no means certain; 
however, merely the fact that they associate the two processes - victory 
in the world with widespread advertisement and subsequent conversion 
to Islam - shows their mindset. According to their perpetrators the at- 
tacks demonstrate that Islam is strong, overcoming the previous (and 
present) time of humiliation, and therefore people will want to convert. 
Power is the method by which the faith will be uplifted; suicide attacks 
demonstrate power and therefore are to the benefit of Islam as a whole. 
This raises the question of the obvious strains and struggles within 
Islam. Clearly radical Muslims have some advantages in their struggle 
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for supremacy within Islam. They are not tied to any government (with 
the exception of the Taliban), they live lives of denial and asceticism, 
they are doing something about the situation of Islam rather than beat- 
ing their breasts in despair, and they proclaim their love for Islam (and 
Muslims who believe as they do) at every juncture. "Martyrdom opera- 
tions" strengthen this impression because of the inherent selflessness of 
the action. However, the strategy behind "martyrdom operations" makes 
many Muslims uneasy, not to mention the questionable methods. There- 
fore, radical Muslims in their struggle to redefine Islam must obtain 
victory as the result of their methods or else the methods will not stand 
up to close examination. Only a final and obvious achievement as a re- 
sult of "martyrdom operations" could prevent Muslims from eventually 
questioning these tactics. 
5. Conclusions 
Suicide attacks present Islam in a way that is extremely favorable to 
radical Muslims. They contrast the self- sacrificial nature of the operation 
with the life of ease lived by their more moderate government-supported 
Muslim opponents. The attacks provide the Muslim world with the spec- 
tacle of cheap, easy victories that are supposed to even out the score with 
the enemy - even though they do not really touch the core of the enemy's 
power. And they invite the revulsion and hatred of precisely those sec- 
tors of world opinion that radical Islam most despises and wants other 
Muslims to despise as well. Within the larger context of the Islamic re- 
vival the issue of "martyrdom operations" is important. Jihad and da(wa 
(proclamation) are two parts of a whole; the methods chosen for one have 
ramifications for the other. Self-sacrificing actions such as "martyrdom 
operations" are designed to highlight and augment the relative worth of 
the belief for which the sacrifice is being made (Islam). It is clear that 
the appearance of "martyrdom operations" tells us that there is a crisis 
of self-worth afflicting large sections of the Muslim world, most espe- 
cially its core. This lack of self- worth is compensated for by martyrdom 
operations. As Ghazi al-Ghusaybi, the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the 
United Kingdom, wrote recently: 
May Allah witness that you are martyrs, 
[May the] Prophet and righteous men witness to that 
You died to glorify the Word of my God . . . 
Did you commit suicide? 
No! We are those who committed suicide, 
In a life where the dead are still living 
(memri.org, Special Dispatch series no. 372 with some of my modifications). 
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It is clear that the contrast being drawn here is that suicide attackers 
are dead, but living, while the Muslim community at large is living but 
dead. 
This is closely derived from the famous Qur'anic verse 3:169: "And do 
not think those who have been killed in the way of Allah as dead; they are 
living with their Lord, well-provided for" (also 2:154). However, neither 
this verse nor classical Muslim thought brings the angle employed by 
the Saudi ambassador: that Muslims who are still alive are at a some- 
what lesser spiritual level than those who are dead. With regard to the 
specific phenomenon of Palestinian martyrdom operations, they should 
also be seen within this larger Muslim "martyrdom complex," even if 
individual cases might be driven by vengeance or despair. In general, 
Palestinian suicide attacks have occurred either at points during which 
radical Muslims would see boundaries breaking down (negotiations, con- 
cessions on the Palestinian side, feelings of humiliation) or as revenge. 
The appearance of martyrdom operations should coincide precisely with 
those elements or influences that are deemed to be the most damaging 
to the boundaries between Islam and the rest of the world. Israel, dur- 
ing the period of the Oslo negotiations (1993-2001), attempted to win 
legitimacy for itself, which constituted a clear danger to the boundaries 
between Islam and infidelity. Likewise, the temptation of American cul- 
ture constituted (and continues to constitute) a danger, hence the attacks 
of September 11. 
One of the likely consequences of the continued glorification of suicide 
attacks in Arabic-language and Urdu-language Islam will be the break- 
down of the strong Muslim taboo against suicide in other contexts. Pak- 
istani scholars have already noted an upsurge in actual suicides, and 
the prevalence of suicide attempts among the Guantanamo Bay pris- 
oners confirms this suspicion. This latter group, taken from the most 
ideologically motivated globalist radical Muslim prisoners, has had an 
incredibly high suicide attempt rate. News reports indicate that between 
31-34 attempts have been made out of approximately 600 prisoners, or 
between 5-6% of the total number. Given the fact that the conditions 
at the prison camp are not extraordinarily harsh when compared with 
prisons where radical Muslims have been kept for years (oftentimes un- 
der appalling conditions of torture), the suicide rate is interesting (BBC, 
February 14, 2003; pentagonnews.com, September 4, 2003). Most proba- 
bly the attempted suicides were unable to keep the line between the glori- 
fication of "martyrdom operations" and actual suicide that the "Islamic 
Ruling concerning the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations" made 
clear. Having been fed a diet of praise for suicide attacks for a number of 
years, this response to imprisonment has most logically presented itself 
in a very powerful manner. One expects that this trend will continue 
and should be investigated in the larger Muslim community - which 
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has also been receiving an inordinate concentration of praise for suicide 
attacks, albeit in a less focused manner. 
This close connection between suicide and suicide attacks or "martyr- 
dom operations" raises the question of motivation for the suicide attack- 
ers of September 11. Scholars (McCaulkey 11) have examined the pos- 
sible motivations of the September 11 attackers. The possibilities seem 
clear: they are psychopaths, they are driven by strong emotions such as 
hatred or anger, or group frustration or love. Rightly they dismissed the 
idea that suicide attackers are psychopaths, and anger and hatred do not 
appear to be prime motivational factors either. In examining the words 
of the attackers themselves and their political and religious mentors the 
issue of humiliation and perceived failure is the largest component in 
deciding upon these operations. Love and devotion to Islam, together 
with frustration over the humiliation and degradation being suffered 
by Muslims in the contemporary world are the major elements in their 
world- view. Of course, one must understand that for pan-Islamists this 
type of humiliation will be felt at any time other than when Islam is 
the dominant political, religious, cultural, technological and economi- 
cal power in the world. The fact that radical Muslims see none of these 
fulfilled or even close to being fulfilled constitutes a negation of their 
belief-system. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find that martyrs are usually drawn 
from the educated stratum of Muslim society (like Albar and Eulogius 
among the Spanish Christians). It is precisely among this group that 
the tension and sense of humiliation is the strongest, and the need to 
affirm one's love and devotion to Islam the strongest. Highlighting the 
faith and civilization they love by dying for it is truly the highest goal in 
life. Precisely this group of people will be most anxious to demonstrate 
to the outside world their rejection of its values, and will even revel in 
the revulsion their actions cause. This for them will affirm that they 
are indeed on the right path. The more they see Islamic civilization hu- 
miliated and degraded the stronger their need to show their absolute 
devotion through ever more extravagant displays of loyalty. 
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